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NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
VOLUME VIII Fall 1990 Part One
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE 1989-90 TERM
by Elliot M. Mincberg*
As America enters the decade of the 1990's, it is particularly
important to carefully review the Supreme Court's first amendment
decisions. Important public controversies related to the first amendment
continue to come before the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. In
the 1989-90 Term alone, the Supreme Court considered far-reaching first
amendment disputes concerning political patronage systems and flag-
burning laws, and witnessed a heated public debate on a constitutional
amendment designed to overrule its flag-burning ruling.' Lower courts
are reviewing controversial first amendment questions ranging from
restrictions on grants by the National Endowment for the Arts to
schoolbook censorship to obscenity prosecutions against Robert
Mapplethorpe photographs and 2 Live Crew, some of which may
eventually be heard by the Supreme Court, and all of which will be
* Legal Director, People For The American Way, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1974,
Northwestern University; J.D. 1977, Harvard University. The author and People For
gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Claude Lee, Sharon Webber, and David
Ziemer, summer legal interns at People For, without whose work this article would not
have been possible.
1. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990); United States v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
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affected by the Court's first amendment jurisprudence.2
As the conservative majority on the Supreme Court, led by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, continues to solidify, civil liberties advocates see
increasing danger that the Rehnquist Court will restrict first amendment
freedoms. The recent resignation of Justice Brennan and President Bush's
subsequent nomination of Judge David Souter as his replacement make
this danger all the more tangible and real. While Judge Souter's views on
many first amendment matters remain unclear, there is little doubt that his
view of constitutional liberties is substantially more narrow than Justice
Brennan's. During the 1989-90 Term alone, Justice Brennan was part of
a narrow 5-4 majority which upheld free speech rights in several cases.3
It is impossible to predict whether these decisions would have come out
the same had Justice Brennan retired one year earlier.
The effects of the Supreme Court's 1989-90 Term first
amendment decisions themselves are mixed. While a majority of the
Supreme Court still appears willing to protect fundamental first
amendment speech and expression rights, the Supreme Court's decisions
caused serious harm in other areas. The most significant damage was done
this term to freedom of religion in Oregon v. Smith,4 where the Supreme
Court effectively reversed decades of precedent by holding that the
"compelling government interest" test is inapplicable to many types of
governmental infringement on religious liberty.' The result may well be
to effectively write the free exercise clause out of the first amendment in
many cases.
In the area of free speech and expression, a majority of the Court
continued to protect individual rights of expression and political
2. See, e.g., Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. NEA, No. 90-3616 (C.D. Cal. filed
July 12, 1990) (challenging constitutionality of NEA requirement that grant recipients
sign "pledge" not to use NEA funds to create obscene or offensive artworks as
precondition to receiving grant funds); Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, No. 90-
6220 (S.D. Fla. filed June 6, 1990) (ruling on status of 2 Live Crew album under
Florida obscenity law and propriety of police conduct pertaining thereto); McCarthy v.
Fletcher, 207 Cal. App. 3d 130, 254 Cal. Rptr. (Ct. App. 1989) (challenging school
book censorship by Wasco Union school district).
3. See, e.g., Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2408-09 (striking down federal law prohibiting
flag desecration as applied to individual political protesters); Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2729
(holding that first amendment prohibited the firing and refusal to promote state workers
based on political party affiliation).
4. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). Smith is discussed in more detail in SECTION IA, infra
notes 11-50 and accompanying text.
5. Id. at 1603-04.
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association and to further extend such protection to attorneys in several
cases.6 However, the Supreme Court failed to protect free speech rights
in less traditional contexts, and, in fact, restricted first amendment
freedoms in some areas. One example of such a restriction is the decision
in Ohio v. Osborne,7 where the Supreme Court appeared to cut back
significantly on the principle recognized in Stanley v. Georgia' that the
first amendment prevents the state from dictating to individuals what they
may possess and read in the privacy of their own homes.9
Smith and Osborne suggest the potential beginning of a disturbing
trend in the Supreme Court's first amendment decisions: rulings which do
not expressly overrule prior first amendment holdings, but effectively
reverse them by radically reinterpreting and limiting them. Civil liberties
advocates and first amendment scholars should take particular care to
guard against and to criticize the use of this technique, a technique which
has also been used by the conservative Supreme Court majority in other
areas in recent years."1
6. See, e.g., Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2408-09 (overturning federal flag burning law
as applied to several individual protesters); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990) (striking down Illinois prohibition against lawyers
advertising their certification as specialists by bona fide private lawyers' organization);
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990) (holding that mandatory state bar
association cannot utilize compulsory dues to finance political and ideological speech and
related activities with which individual attorney disagrees); Butterworth v. Smith, 110
S. Ct. 1376 (1990) (holding that Florida could not constitutionally prohibit an individual
grand jury witness from disclosing testimony after grand jury term had expired). These
decisions are discussed in more detail in SECTION II, infra notes 110-347 and
accompanying text.
7. 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
8. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
9. In addition to Osborne, see United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990)
(upholding conviction of members of political advocacy group for soliciting on sidewalk
in front of post office); Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 110 S. Ct. 768
(1990) (holding that group boycott by appointed criminal defense attorneys representing
indigent criminal defendants was not expressive in nature so as to warrant first
amendment protection). These and other free speech cases are discussed in SECTION
I1, infra notes 110-347.
10. For example, in the civil rights area, the Court in Wards Cove Packing Co.,
v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), recently undertook what has been described as a
"dramatic departure from longstanding precedent" which "overturned [the] long
prevailing allocation of the burden of proof of business necessity" to the detriment of
plaintiffs in job discrimination cases. See S. Rep. No. 586, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18.
Although the 5-4 majority in Wards Cove contended that its rulng was consistent with
prior case law, 109 S. Ct. 2124-25, lower courts have recognized the substantial change
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The remainder of this article will analyze in more detail each of
the Supreme Court's fifteen first amendment decisions issued during the
1989-90 Term. As discussed below, these rulings fall into two broad
categories: decisions concerning freedom of religion and decisions
concerning freedom of speech, press, and association.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS ON FREEDOM
OF RELIGION
A. Decisions Concerning the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause
The Supreme Court's most significant freedom of religion
decision in the 1989-90 Term was Oregon v. Smith. " In Smith, the
majority substantially reinterpreted previous Supreme Court cases
involving the free exercise of religion under the first amendment. The
compelling interest test, applied in the past to state actions that infringed
upon the rights of individuals, was effectively reduced to a rational basis
test. A broad range of first amendment scholars and advocacy groups
agree that the opinion dramatically weakened the free exercise clause. As
conservative constitutional expert William Bentley Ball stated, the opinion
moved religious liberty "to the back of the constitutional bus--maybe off
the bus." 2
Smith involved two members of the Native American Church who
used peyote for sacramental purposes. 3 The two men were fired from
their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization because of their
peyote use. 4 When they applied for unemployment compensation
benefits, they were declared ineligible. "5 The state argued that the denial
in employment discrimination law caused by Wards Cove. See, e.g., Hill v. Seaboard
Coast Line R.R., 885 F.2d 804, 812 n.12 (lth Cir. 1989) (noting that Wards Cove
"overruled the existing law in this circuit" on burden of proof concerning business
necessity); Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that Wards
Cove "modified the ground rules that most lower courts have followed in disparate
impact cases").
11. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
12. See Letter from Representatives Paul Henry and Stephen Solarz to members of
Congress (June 27, 1990) (regarding the Smith decision).
13. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597-98.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1598.
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of benefits was valid because the use of peyote was a crime in Oregon."
The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that although sacramental peyote use was prohibited by the state,
the prohibition was unconstitutional as applied because it was an
infringement on religious freedom and it was not justified by a compelling
government interest.
1 7
By a 6-3 margin, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Oregon Supreme Court and upheld the state's denial of unemployment
benefits. 8  Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, in which he
acknowledged that the exercise of religion involves not only belief but
also performance of physical acts. 9 Justice Scalia also agreed that a state
violates the right to free exercise of religion if it seeks to ban conduct
specifically because of the religious belief involved.' The majority
rejected the contention, however, that prior Supreme Court precedent
required this rationale to be carried one step further. The majority ruled
that Oregon's facially neutral drug law was clearly constitutional as
applied, and despite the fact that it conflicted with sincere religious
beliefs, Oregon was not required to justify its infringement of religious
freedom as necessary to promote a compelling government interest.21
According to the majority, any other result would allow religious
motivation to place an individual beyond the reach of criminal law and
would permit individuals to become a law unto themselves.'
Although the result in Smith was not suprising, the rationale
utilized by the majority was unexpected. Prior to Smith, cases in which
facially neutral government regulations were challenged as violating the
free exercise clause were generally analyzed using the compelling interest
test of Sherbert v. Verner.' Under the Sherbert test, governmental
actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified as
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.' This test
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1595 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ., joined in the
majority opinion; O'Connor, J., wrote a separate opinion concurring in the result; and
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissented).
19. Id. at 1599.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1603.
22. Id. at 1600.
23. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03).
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effectively accomodated the individual's interest in religious freedom with
the government's interest in society-wide regulation. However, the
majority in Smith ruled that the compelling interest test did not apply at
all, and that the Oregon rule could be upheld because it was of general
applicability.'
Justice Scalia attempted to justify the refusal to apply the
compelling interest test. He asserted that it had never been applied to
determine whether individuals should be exempted from generally
applicable criminal statutes, and that the test had rarely been used outside
the scope of unemployment compensation cases like Sherbert.' Scalia
maintained that other than in such cases, the test had been used in cases
involving the free exercise of religion only where some other
constitutional right was also involved, such as freedom of speech27 or the
parental right to direct the education of their children.' The Smith case
did not involve such a "hybrid situation" concerning free excercise and
some other constitutional right.? The majority ruled, therefore, that
where a case raises only free exercise claims, the compelling interest test
is inapplicable and the government essentially has a free hand to
regulate."
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that the
majority drastically reinterpreted previous free exercise cases." Justice
O'Connor's concurrence explained that under a fair reading of previous
Supreme Court precedent, religious conduct motivated by sincere religious
belief is presumptively protected by the first amendment.3 2 Laws that
effectively bar individuals from engaging in religious conduct, even while
not explicitly discriminating against religion, prevent the free exercise of
religion.33 As Justice O'Connor explained, few states would enact laws
that directly target a religious practice. 4 The majority's test relegates
a serious first amendment right to a low level of scrutiny that is already
25. Id. at 1603.
26. Id. at 1602-03.
27. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
28. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
29. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02.
30. Id. at 1602.
31. Id. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring).





provided by the equal protection clause. 3 Indeed, Justice O'Connor
wrote that the majority opinion in Smith "dramatically departs from well-
settled First Amendment jurisprudence" and is "incompatible with our
Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty."I
Justice O'Connor's opinion demonstrated the error in the
majority's analysis. The free exercise clause has continually been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to forbid general application of an act
that infringes upon religious conduct where there is no compelling state
interest. Wisconsin v. Yoder,37 Justice O'Connor explained, was a prime
example of where the free exercise clause has been used in this
manner. 3  Despite Justice Scalia's attempt to maintain that Yoder had
utilized the compelling government interest because it involved parents'
rights to control the upbringing of their children,39 Yoder had relied
expressly on the free exercise clause.' Justice O'Connor contended that
Yoder has been regarded as part of the mainstream of free exercise cases,
disregarded by the majority in Smith, which had held that a regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, offend the free exercise
clause.41
Finally, Justice O'Connor explained that the same result reached
by the majority could also have been reached consistent with established
free exercise jurisprudence.42 Under her analysis, the state had a
compelling interest in enforcing laws that control the possession and use
of controlled substances by its citizens.'
35. Id. at 1606.
36. Id.
37. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
38. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 1601.
40. See generally Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-29.
41. Id. In addition to Yoder, see Hobbie v. Unemployment Comm'n of Fla., 480
U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987) (noting that a minimum scrutiny test for burdens on free
exercise of religion has no basis in precedent); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982) (upholding requirement of payment of social security taxes against free exercise
claim based on compelling interest test).
42. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented in Smith,
110 S. Ct. at 1615. The dissent agreed with Justice O'Connor that the application of the
compelling interest test ensures fairness to all religions when it is uniformly applied, and
that the majority erred by departing from the previous standard. Id. at 1616. However,
in contrast to Justice O'Connor, the dissent maintained that the state failed to meet the
burden established by the compelling interest test because it did not show sufficient harm
1990]
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Shortly after the decision in Smith, a coalition of religious and
civil liberties groups, ranging from the ACLU and People For The
American Way to the National Association of Evangelicals and the
Christian Legal Society, joined Gerald Gunther, Laurence Tribe and some
fifty-three other constitutional law professors in filing a petition for
rehearing." The petition pointed out that neither side in Smith had
argued or even considered the rationale adopted by the majority, which
flatly contradicted the Supreme Court's previous free exercise decisions.
The petition argued that "every religious group in the country will be
profoundly disadvantaged by the majority's rule," which could permit
government to "outlaw as medically unnecessary all circumcision,
including those practiced for religious reasons," or "outlaw all use of
alcoholic beverages, including that used for communion and other
religious purposes."45 The Supreme Court denied the petition without
comment.46
As result of the Smith decision, Representatives Stephen Solarz
(D. N.Y.) and Paul Henry (R. MI) introduced the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act in Congress. 7 Supported by many of the same diverse
groups which sought rehearing in Smith, the bill would effectively
overrule the majority by creating a statutory right to religious freedom,
which could only be infringed by the government where it fulfills the
compelling interest test .4  Although the bill could not and would not
overrule the Supreme Court's determination of the applicable test under
the first amendment, the effect of the bill would be similar, since it would
establish a federal statutory right closely resembling the pre-Smith free
exercise doctrine.49 The bill has attained bipartisan support, and
prospects appear favorable for it to be passed in 1991.1
The Supreme Court rendered a less controversial free exercise
decision in Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization.1 In
from the use of peyote and it is not enough to speculate that there is potential harm in
order to establish a compelling interest. Id. at 1621-23.
44. See Petition for Rehearing, Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-
1213).
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
47. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Moore, Religious Rights in the Balance, 22 NAT'L J. 1981 (1990).
51. 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990).
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that case, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a California appellate court
ruling that the religion clauses of the first amendment did not prohibit a
state from imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the
distribution of religious materials by a religious organization, Jimmy
Swaggert Ministries. 2 The California Sale and Use Tax Law required
retailers to pay a sales tax for retail goods that were sold in the state.53
The tax was imposed on the retailer and collected by the retailer at the
time of sale.' Religious organizations were not exempted from the sales
and use tax.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Supreme
Court. Justice O'Connor stated that a regulation neutral on its face may
nonetheless burden the free exercise of religion.55 The free exercise
inquiry must ask whether the governmental burden on the right is
substantial and, if so, whether the state can justify such a burden under
applicable constitutional requirements.'
The Supreme Court ruled that the tax did not impose a
constitutionally significant burden on Swaggert's free exercise rights.57
Specifically the Supreme Court rejected Swaggert's broad reading of
Murdock v. Pennsylvania,58 where the Supreme Court ruled that a flat
tax enacted was an unlawful prior restraint on a minister." 9 Murdock
was later applied to an ordinance that required all booksellers to pay a flat
fee to procure a license to sell books in Follet v. McCormick.' The
Supreme Court in Swaggert held that Murdock and Follet stood for the
proposition that a flat license tax cannot act as a precondition to or prior
restraint on the exercise of religion.6
52. Id. at 697, 699.
53. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6051 (West 1987).
54. Id. §§ 6051, 6202-6206 (West Supp. 1989).
55. Swaggert, 110 S. Ct. at 693.
56. Id. Interestingly, the unanimous court in Swaggert stated that in order to justify
a "substantial burden" on religous freedom under the free exercise clause, the state must
show that a "compelling government interest justifies the burden." Id. Less than six
months later, in Smith, the Court's majority effectively reversed that standard. Smith,
110 S. Ct. at 1603-06.
57. Id. at 697.
58. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
59. Swaggert, 110 S. Ct. at 694.
60. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
61. Swaggert, 110 S. Ct. at 694-95.
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In contrast, the Supreme Court in Swaggert explained, the
California tax was simply a general sales and use tax on property, not a
precondition or tax on the right to the free exercise of religion. 2 The
Supreme Court relied on Follet to support the proposition that states may
impose general taxes on income from religious activities.' The
government may thus impose personal property and other taxes on the
church and is not constitutionally required to grant an exemption.'
However, the Supreme Court left open the question of whether a general
tax with a more "onerous tax rate . . . might effectively choke off an
adherent's religious practices," potentially violating the free exercise
clause. 6
B. Decisions Involving the Establishment Clause
In Swaggert, the Supreme Court also ruled that the California tax
was consistent with the establishment clause of the first amendment.'
Swaggert alleged that the collection and payment of the tax imposed
improper burdens on religion and fostered excessive entanglement between
the ministry and the government, violating the Supreme Court's ruling in
Lemon v. Kurzman.67
Under Lemon, government action violates the establishment clause
if it has the effect of promoting or impairing religion, fostering excessive
government entanglement with religion, or has a non-secular purpose."
In applying the Lemon test in Swaggert, the Supreme Court stated that it
was clear that the general sales tax had a secular purpose and neither
advanced nor inhibited religion.69 The nature of the tax was neutral on
the question of religious belief.' The "core values" of the establishment
clause were thus not even remotely called into question by the generally
62. Id. at 696.
63. id. at 694. "[A] preacheris not 'free from all financial burdens of government,
including taxes on income . . .' and, 'like other citizens, may be subject to general
taxation.'" Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Foller, 321 U.S. at 578).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 697.
66. Id. at 697-98.
67. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
68. Id. at 612-13.




applicable sales and use tax.71
The Supreme Court also concluded that the state had not violated
the third prong of the Lemon test.' Justice O'Connor explained that
generally applicable administrative and record-keeping regulations do not
run afoul of the establishment clause.' r Justice O'Connor explained, for
example, that the record-keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act74 (FLSA) are more burdensome than the paperwork required in
Swaggert, and the FLSA was found not to improperly entangle
government in religious affairs.75 The fact that Swaggert bore the cost
of collecting and remitting the tax did not impermissibly enmesh the
government in religious affairs.76
The more controversial case involving the establishment clause
during the past term was Board of Education of Westside Community
Schools v. Mergens.77 In Mergens, high school students brought an
action against a school district seeking to require it to permit a student-led
religious club to meet on school premises after school hours on the same
basis as school-sponsored extracurricular activities.7" The students
contended that the school district's denial of their request violated the
federal Equal Access Act79 and the first amendment. The District Court
71. Id.
72. The establishment clause of the first amendment prohibits Congress from
enacting any law respecting an establishment of religion. In determining whether a
congressional enactment violates the establishment clause, the Supreme Court has
examined three principal criteria: (1) whether the statute has a secular legislative
purpose; (2) whether the principal or primary effect of the statute is neither to advance
nor to inhibit religion; and (3) whether the statute fosters an excessive government
entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
73. Swaggert, 110 S. Ct. at 690.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (1965).
75. See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-
06 (1985).
76. Swaggert, 110 5. Ct. at 699.
77. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
78. Id. at 2362.
79. The Equal Access Act of 1984, which was enacted by Congress to resolve the
issue of the use of school facilities by religious and political groups, provides in relevant
part:
It shall be unlawful for any public
secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open
forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity
to, or discriminate against, any students who
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ruled for the Board," but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed on statutory grounds."1 Eight of the nine Justices agreed that
the Board had violated the Equal Access Act and that the Act did not
conflict with the establishment clause.' The Justices disagreed,
however, on the question of what steps school districts like Westside
should take in order to administer the Act consistent with the
establishment clause.83
On the statutory question of whether the Board had violated the
Act, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that a secondary school must
permit religious or political clubs to meet if it has a "limited open
forum." 4  The Supreme Court also agreed that such a forum exists
under the Act whenever such a public school allows one or more
noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises. 5
Because the Act did not define the term "non-curriculum-related" student
group, the Supreme Court was required to do so." The majority ruled
that a "non-curriculum-related-student group" properly means any student
group that is not directly related to the body of courses taught at the
school.8 7 Since a chess club and several other groups which were
noncurricular according to the Court's definition existed at Westside, the
Court ruled that the Act applied and that the school was required to
wish to conduct a meeting within that limited
open forum on the basis of the religious,
political, philosophical, or other content of the
speech at such meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
80. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2363.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2360-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., and Blackmun, Brennan, Kennedy, Marshall,
O'Connor, Scalia, and White, JJ., agreed that the school's action violated the Equal
Access Act and that the Act did not conflict with the establishment clause; Stevens, J.,
filed the only dissent).
83. Id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2378 (Marshall, J., concurring);
id. at 2383 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2370; id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2378 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id. at 2383 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2370.
86. Id. at 2365-67.
87. Id. at 2370.
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permit religious groups to meet under the Act.8"
The Supreme Court went on to determine that the Equal Access
Act did not violate the establishment clause." Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion' essentially concluded that the issue was determined by
the decision in Widmar v. Vincent,9" which held that an "equal access"
policy at the university level was consistent with the establishment
clause.' Applying the three-part Lemon test,' the plurality explained
that the Act's avowed purpose of preventing discrimination against
political and philosophical as well as religious speech in public schools
was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the test.' The plurality also
concluded that as long as schools follow the Act's provisions limiting
participation by school officials in religious clubs, there would be no
excessive entanglement between government and religion.95
The Supreme Court also rejected the school board's contention
that the Act had the effect of advancing religion by projecting the image
of school sponsorship of religious club activities." The plurality
reasoned that there was a significant difference between government and
private endorsement of religion.' Government endorsement of religion
is forbidden by the establishment clause, but private endorsement is
protected by the free speech and free exercise clauses.9" Just as the
88. In reaching its decision on the proper interpretation of the Act, the Court
rejected the argument of the school district and several amici that a student group should
be considered curriculum-related if it is sponsored or encouraged by the school and is
generally related to the school's curricular goals, as well as Justice Stevens's contention
that a group should be considered noncurriculum-related only if at least part of its
purpose is to advance partisan, political, theological or ethical views. Id. at 2368-69.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the majority's definition is potentially subject
to manipulation, is difficult for school districts to apply even in the absence of evasion,
and raises establishment clause problems in its implementation. Id. at 2387-88 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2373 (plurality opinion).
90. Id. at 2361 (O'Connor, J., wasjoined by White, Blackmun, JJ., and Rehnquist,
C.J.).
91. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
92. Id. at 271-75.
93. See supra note 72.
94. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371 (plurality opinion).
95. Id. at 2372-73.
96. Id. at 2373.
97. Id. at 2372.
98. Id. at 2371-72.
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Court ruled with respect to college students in Widmar, the plurality
endorsed Congress' view that high school students could distinguish
between a neutral equal access policy and state sponsorship of religion.'
The plurality explained that as long as a school makes clear that
permitting a club to meet is not an endorsement of its views, students will
understand that the school's attitude is one of neutrality towards religious
speech, not endorsement."
It was the question of endorsement which led to disagreement
among the Justices. Justices Kennedy and Scalia agreed with the
judgment but believed that a different test should be used to determine
compliance with the establishment clause. 1 Their concurring opinion
suggested that "endorsement" should not be sufficent to violate the
establishment clause, since it could well be inevitable that a public high
school would endorse religion in the common sense use of the term if a
club is allowed on its premises."° According to Justices Kennedy and
Scalia, the proper test involved looking for coercion."o "The inquiry
.. must be whether the government imposes pressure upon a student to
participate in a religious activity." ' ' Schools would violate the
Constitution only if they coerce students to participate in the religious
clubs. 05
Although Justices Marshall and Brennan also agreed with the
judgment in Mergens, they expressed a significantly different view as to
the steps necessary to ensure against violation of the establishment
clause." According to Justices Marshall and Brennan, the Act was the
codification of a constitutional mandate forbidding discrimination with
respect to access to school facilities for expressive purposes not directly
related to school curriculum. 0 7 The inclusion of a religious club in
such a forum, they argued, poses a danger that other clubs do not
present."' Just as the university sought to maintain its neutrality in
Widmar, maintaining neutrality toward religion will become an issue that
99. Id. at 2372.
100. Id. at 2372-73.
101. Id. at 2377-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).




106. Id. at 2378-79 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., concurring).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2381.
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a high school will have to confront. If a school encourages student
participation in extra-curricular activities and a religious club is the only
"controversial" club on the high school campus, the fine distinction
between endorsing the group and following the Act may be lost.
Therefore, according to Justices Marshall and Brennan, in order to remain
consistent with the establishment clause, a school like Westside must fully
dissassociate itself from the club's religious speech and avoid appearing
to sponsor or endorse the club's goals." °
The Supreme Court's decision in Mergens suggests problems for
the future. Although the Supreme Court may be able to agree that a high
school cannot exclude religious groups from a limited open forum, the
Court appears divided on how a school which includes such groups should
act in order to comply with the establishment clause. If a majority of the
Supreme Court were to accept the Kennedy-Scalia coercion test,
established principles involving the separation of church and state could
become eroded. The Mergens decision may well lead to further litigation
on this and related church-state issues in the future.
II. THE COURT'S DECISIONS ON FREEDOMS OF SPEECH,
PRESS AND ASSOCIATION
A. Decisions Concerning the Application of
the First Amendment to Challenged Activities
A number of the Supreme Court's free speech and association
decisions this term concerned whether the first amendment applies to
particular expressive activities. These rulings by the Court were mixed.
Although several of the Court's 1989-90 decisions helped protect first
amendment interests, several pose serious dangers for first amendment
rights.
Two of the decisions in which the Supreme Court held that the
first amendment was applicable involved the rights of individual attorneys
to speak, or not to speak, contrary to attempted state bar regulation. In
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission, "0 the
Supreme Court addressed some previously unanswered questions
109. Id.
110. 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
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concerning the regulation of advertising by lawyers."' In a narrow 5-4
decision, the Court ruled that it was improper to completely ban a
lawyer's advertising that was not actually or inherently misleading." 2
Additionally, the plurality also suggested that even if it were determined
that the advertisement was potentially misleading, a categorical ban on the
advertisement is still prohibited by the first amendment.1'3
The advertisement at issue was a statement on an attorney's
letterhead that read: "Certified Civil Trial Specialist by the National Board
of Trial Advocacy." This was followed directly by the phrase "Licensed:
Illinois, Missouri, Arizona." The Illinois disciplinary committee filed a
complaint alleging that the advertisement violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility." 4  The Illinois Supreme Court held that the letterhead
was misleading and therefore not protected by the first amendment." 5
111. Id. A lawyer's first amendment right to advertise was first recognized in Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), which held that a total ban on advertising
of prices by private attorneys was invalid. The Court left unanswered the validity of in-
person solicitation or advertising claims relating to the quality of legal services. Id. at
366. Five years later in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), the Court again directly
addressed the validity of attorney advertising. In an unanimous decision, the Court
invalidated three categories of regulations on lawyer advertising: (1) a regulation that
allowed only certain subject areas to be listed as specialties; (2) a regulation which
forbade listings of admission to the bars of neighboring states and the United States
Supreme Court; and (3) a regulation that banned the mailing of announcements of office
openings except to clients, friends and relatives. Id. at 205-07. The Court's most recent
pronouncement in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985),
held that a lawyer: (1) may place advertisements that are geared to persons with specific
legal problems; (2) may not be disciplined for the content of advertisements based on
substantial interest justifying a ban on in-person solicitation; and (3) may not be
disciplined for advertisements containing truthful and non deceptive information and legal
advice. Id. at 639-53. However, the Court did not hold that it was valid to require a
lawyer who advertises legal counsel on a contingency-fee basis to disclose that the client
is required to pay costs.
112. Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2292-93 (Stevens, J., wrote the opinion for the plurality
and was joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Kennedy, JJ.; Marshall, J., wrote a
concurring opinion in which Brennan, J., joined; White, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
as did O'Connor, J., in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., joined).
113. Id.
114. Specifically, the commission alleged that petitioner violated Rule 2-105(a)(3)
which stated that: "A lawyer or law firm may specify or designate any area or field of
law in which he or its partners concentrates or limits his or its practice. Except as set
forth in Rule 2-105(a) no lawyer may hold himself out as 'certified' or a 'specialist."'
Id. at 2286. The exceptions were for patent, trademark and admiralty lawyers. Id.
115. Id.
1990] FIRST AMENDMENT 17
The Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on the intermediate
scrutiny standard applicable to commercial speech as applied in prior
court decisions concerning a lawyer's commercial speech.
116
The plurality rejected the Illinois court's suggestion that the
implied claim as to the "quality" of the petitioner's legal services was so
likely to mislead as to warrant a categorical ban and a decision that the
first amendment provided no protection to the advertisment, noting that
such an analysis "confuses the distinction between statements of opinion
or quality and statements of objective facts that may support an inference
of quality.' '1 17  In addition, the plurality rejected the Illinois court's'
116. Traditionally, commercial speech has not received the same degree of
protection under the first amendment that has been accorded to noncommercial speech.
The development of the commercial speech doctrine began with Valentine v.
Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), and was further expanded in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), where the
Court held that a categorical ban on a pharmacy's price advertising was a violation of
the first amendment. As articulated by the Court in 1982, the commercial speech
doctrine provides that in order for a restriction on commercial speech to be valid "the
State must assert a substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in
proportion to the States's interest served Restrictions must be narrowly drawn, and the
State lawfully may regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the State's substantial
interest." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elee.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980)). In the context of
advertising for professional services, the Court has explained that
[tlruthful advertising related to lawful activities
is entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment. But when the particular content or
method of the advertising suggests that it is
inherently misleading or when experience has
proved that in fact such advertising is subject to
abuse, the States may impose appropriate
restrictions. Misleading advertising may be
prohibited entirely. But the States may not place
an absolute prohibition on certain types of
potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing
of areas of practice, if the information also may
be presented in a way that is not deceptive.
Id.
117. Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2288 (plurality opinion). Although agreeing with the
plurality's conclusion, Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion suggested that the
lawyer's letterhead was potentially misleading and, thus, the state could enact regulations
other than a total ban. Justice Marshall concluded that facts as well as opinions can be
misleading when they are not presented with adequate supporting information. Id. at
2293 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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concern that petitioner's statement about his certification as a "specialist"
by an identified national organization necessarily would be confused with
formal state recognition."' The plurality extended great deference to
the consumer's ability to discern between two statements and rejected "the
paternalistic assumption that the recipients of petitioner's letterhead are no
more discriminating than the audience for children's television." 9
After concluding that the advertising statement was not actually
misleading, the plurality addressed the State Bar Commission's claim that
the statement was potentially misleading and, thus, still warranted a
categorical ban."2 The plurality explained that even if some consumers
would be confused by the advertisement, a categorical ban was broader
than necessary to prevent the "perceived evil." 1 '
The Supreme Court was respectful of the Commission's desire to
protect consumers from sham advertising and suggested that a sham
certification would not necessarily be entitled to first amendment
protection. " The plurality also noted that the Supreme Court's
decision did not determine whether a state may impose certain less
restrictive disclaimer requirements for certification advertisements.
1
13
The holding was limited to the declaration that a total ban on potentially
misleading commercial speech is unconstitutional if narrower restrictions
could be imposed to reach the same goal of protecting the public."
118. Id. at 2289 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 2290 (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor argued in her dissenting
opinion that the plurality had incorrectly abandoned the requirement that a state mentor
claim be verifiable by the ordinary consumer of legal services. Id. at 2299 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2292-93 (plurality opinion). Justice White in his dissenting opinion
concluded that the advertisement was potentially misleading. He would only prohibit a
categorical ban of an advertisement that did not include a disclaimer that shielded the
public from any danger of deception. However, he suggested that the total ban was
valid as applied to the particular advertisement at issue because there was no disclaimer.
Id. at 2297 (White, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2291 (plurality opinion). This position is in line with the principle
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 455 U.S. 478 (1976), that disclosure of truthful, relevant information
is more likely to make a positive contribution to decision making than is concealment of
such information.
122. Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2292 (plurality opinion).
123. Id.
124. Id. The plurality thus agreed with Justice Marshall's concurring opinion that
the decision may not preclude a state from regulating commercial speech in a less
restrictive manner. Id. at 2292 n.17. Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan
[Vol. VIII
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The remaining unanswered question concerns what types of less restrictive
regulations will pass constitutional muster.
The second case concerning attorneys involved the right of an
individual attorney not to be compelled to finance activities of an
ideological or political nature, as a member of a state bar.1" In Keller
v. Sfate Bar of California, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a
unanimous Court reversing the California Supreme Court and holding that
the first amendment prohibited an integrated state bar from using
membership dues to finance such activities. 27
Petitioners in Keller were members of the State Bar of California
who sued alleging that the state bar unconstitutionally used mandatory
dues payments to finance ideological and political causes in violation of
their first amendment rights.' 2 Pursuant to its holding in Lathrop v.
Donohue,": the Supreme Court agreed with California's requirement
that attorneys who are admitted to practice law in the state must join and
pay dues to the State Bar."3 In Keller, the Court looked to the scope
of permissible dues-financed activities in which the bar could engage."'
This issue had been left open in Lathrop.
The Supreme Court rejected the bar's argument that its
classification as a "state agency" meant that the first amendment did not
apply at all and that there were no constitutional restrictions on the use of
joined, concluded that the statement was potentially misleading on the basis that the
name "National Board of Trial Advocacy" could be misinterpreted as a governmental
agency. In addition, Justice Marshall placed emphasis on the fact that the statement of
certification was juxtaposed with the listing of states in which petitioner is licensed. Id.
at 2294 (Marshall, J., concurring).
125. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2238.
128. Id. at 2231. Some of the activities challenged by petitioners included the state
bar's involvement in lobbying either for or against state legislation (1) prohibiting state
and local agency employers from requiring employees to take polygraph tests; (2)
prohibiting possession of armor piercing handgun ammunition; (3) creating an unlimited
right of action to sue any entity causing air pollution; and (4) requesting Congress to
refrain from enacting a guest worker program or from permitting the importation of
workers from other countries. Id. at 2231-32 n.2.
129. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
130. Keller, 110 S. Ct. at 2236.
131. Id.
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its dues.132 The Supreme Court distinguished the state bar from other
traditional governmental agencies on the grounds that its financing is not
from appropriations made by the legislature, but rather from dues levied
on its members by the Board of Governors. 33
In rejecting the use of compulsory dues to finance activities of an
ideological or political nature, the Supreme Court analogized the bar's
activities to those of the public employee labor union in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education."4 In Abood, the Supreme Court held that although
the Constitution will not prohibit a public employee union from spending
"funds for the expression of political views,... the Constitution requires
only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or
assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas
and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of
loss of governmental employment." 33 Specifically, mandatory dues
could only be used to finance activities that were germane to the purpose
for which compelled membership was justified." The Supreme Court
concluded in Keller that compelled association in the bar, which is
justified by the state's interest in regulating and improving the quality of
the legal profession, is similar to the compelled association in the labor
union which is necessary for collective bargaining. 37 The Supreme
Court thus held that the state bar is limited to using its mandatory dues to
132. At trial, petitioners sought an injunction restraining respondents from using
mandatory bar dues or the name of the State Bar of California to advance political or
ideological causes or beliefs. The trial court granted respondents' motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the State Bar is a state agency and thus permitted under the
first amendment to engage in the challenged activities. When the Supreme Court of
California reversed the court of appeals, it also held that "the state bar, considered as
a governmental agency, may use dues for any purpose within the scope of its statutory
authority." Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1168, 767 P.2d 1020, 1030,
255 Cal. Rptr. 542, 552 (1989) (with the exception of certain election campaigning, the
Court concluded that all of the challenged activities fell within respondent's statutory
authority).
133. Keller, 110 S. Ct. at 2234-35. In addition, the Court held that the specialized
characteristics of the State Bar serves to further distinguish it from a "state agency." For
example, the Supreme Court noted that the bar's members are lawyers and that the
ultimate responsibility of the bar is to govern the legal profession, not to partake in the
general government of the state. Id. at 2235.
134. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
135. Id. at 235-36.
136. Id.
137. Keller, 110 S. Ct. at 2236.
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fund activities that are germane to those goals.13s The Supreme Court
thus ruled that the state bar may make expenditures using mandatory dues
only where "the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or 'improving
the quality of the legal service available to the people of the state.' "139
The Supreme Court recognized the possible difficulties in discerning
between the different classifications of activities. However, the Supreme
Court ruled that the activities which petitioners complained of in Keller
were clearly outside the realm of activities that could be financed through
compulsory dues."*
Despite the Supreme Court's unanimous ruling in Keller, one
question remained unanswered. The petitioner in Keller also asserted that
the bar's use of its name to advance causes or beliefs which could not be
funded by mandatory dues violated their first amendment rights. 4' The
attorneys thereby contended that the first amendment prohibits any
compelled association with an organization that engages in political or
ideological activities.142 The Supreme Court refrained from answering
that question because the California Supreme Court did not address the
issue. Since the Supreme Court clearly upheld mandatory bar
membership in Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson,'43 and also
ruled in Abood that a union could spend non-mandatory dues funds to
express political views,'" it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will
recognize a first amendment right not to associate with a mandatory state
bar association.
In several other decisions this term, the Supreme Court ruled that
the first amendment was inapplicable, even though expressive activity was
arguably involved in two of these cases. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Association,45 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion,
holding that a group boycott by criminal defense lawyers seeking to obtain
a compensation increase for representing indigent criminal defendants was
not expressive in nature so as to warrant first amendment protection.'
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843).
140. Id. at 2237.
141. Id. at 2238.
142. Id.
143. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
144. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
145. 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990).
146. Id. at 770.
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The case involved lawyers in private practice who were appointed
and compensated pursuant to the District of Columbia Criminal Justice
Act (CJA) to defend indigent criminal defendants. 7 Beginning in
1982, the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA), as well as
other bar groups, sought to increase the rates of compensation to at least
$35 per hour. 4  In 1983, after a failed legislative effort, the CJA
lawyers formed a "strike committee" at a SCTLA meeting and agreed
"'that the only viable way of getting an increase in fees was to stop
signing up to take new CJA appointments .... ""'49 Approximately
one hundred CJA lawyers accordingly stopped accepting new
assignments."o
Fearing a virtual collapse of the criminal justice system, the
District of Columbia mayor offered to support an immediate fee
increase."' The CJA lawyers accepted the offer and implementing
legislation was passed unanimously. 52  But the FTC then filed a
complaint against SCTLA alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in violation
of the Sherman Act and to engage in unfair methods of trade practice in
violation of the FTC Act.'53 Among their other defenses, the CJA
lawyers contended that the boycott was a form of political expression
protected by the first amendment.1  Although the FTC Administrative
Law Judge dismissed the case on the ground that the effect of the boycott
was beneficial, the FTC ruled that the lawyers' "'concerted refusal to
deal' had the 'purpose and effect of raising prices' and was illegal per se"
under the antitrust laws, without any analysis of whether the boycott
actually had an anti-competitive effect.'55
The Court of Appeals, however, vacated the FTC's decision." '
The court accepted the defense that the boycott contained an element of
147. Id. at 770-71.
148. id. at 771.
149. Id. (quoting In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 538
(1986)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 772.
152. Id. at 771.
153. ld. at 772-73.
154. Id. at 773.




expression that should be protected by the first amendment. 57 Applying
the test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien,"' the court ruled that
a restriction on boycotts, which have historically been a means of
expression, could not be justified unless it is no greater than essential to
an important governmental interest.'" The court concluded that the
FTC's use of the per se rule against a boycott with a significant
expressive component was erroneous and that the FTC must "'prove
rather than presume that the evil against which the Sherman Act is
directed looms in the conduct it condemns."''  The appellate court
accordingly remanded the case to the FTC to determine whether the trial
lawyers actually had "significant market power" and thus whether the
boycott actually had an anti-competitive effect. 6'
The Supreme Court reversed. 62 Although the Supreme Court
conceded that the boycott may well have served a worthwhile cause and
produced better legal representation for indigent defendants, the Court
rejected all of the lawyers' defenses, including the first amendment
claim. " The SCTLA contended that their activity deserved first
amendment protection similar to that granted to petitioners in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware." The Supreme Court distinguished the
boycotters in NAACP from those in SCTLA on the basis that the
boycotters in NAACP were not motivated by any desire to lessen
157. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 250 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
158. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
159. SCTLA, 110 S. Ct. at 774.
160. Id. (quoting SCTLA, 856 F.2d at 296).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The Supreme Court echoed the long-standing position that the statutory policy
underlying the Sherman Anti-Trust Act "'precludes inquiry into the question whether
competition is good or bad."' Id. at 775 (quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)). Similarly, the Supreme Court held that
the reasonableness of the fees set was irrelevant and that the lawyers' boycott was not
immune from anti-trust liability simply because its goal was favorable legislation. Id.
164. 458 U.S. 886 (1985). In NAACP, black citizens had boycotted white
merchants. Id. at 889. The white merchants then sued under state law to recover the
losses they had sustained. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that "[tihe right of the
States to regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a
nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic
change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself." Id. at 914. The
Supreme Court held that "nonviolent elements of petitioners' activities are entitled to the
protection of [the] First Amendment." Id. at 914-15.
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competition, but rather sought equality and racial justice.'" According
to the Supreme Court, the CJA lawyers were motivated solely by the
desire to lessen competition and stood to benefit personally from an
increase in the fees.'"
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the rationale of the court
of appeals and suggested that the lower court had exaggerated the
boycott's expressive component and underestimated the perniciousness of
price-fixing agreements.167 The Supreme Court refused to accept the
CJA lawyers' claim on the basis that any concerted refusal to deal could
be interpreted as having an expressive component. 1" The Supreme
Court, in upholding the use of the per se rule, emphasized the belief that
"the administrative efficiency interest in antitrust regulation are unusually
compelling.""
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented."7 The dissent stressed
the importance of determining whether the effects of the boycott were
caused by political or economic forces.' It may well have been, the
dissent suggested, that the boycott had more of a political than an
economic force because of the persuasiveness of its message."
Applying the per se rule to such a complex situation precluded the Court
from analyzing the possibility that the voter support for the boycott gave
political leaders the confidence to raise CJA rates during a time of fiscal
austerity.'7'
Although the existence of an expressive component alone would
not render the boycott immune from the per se rule, the dissent argued
where such an expressive component is present and where there is a
165. SCTLA, 110 S. Ct. at 777.
166. Id. at 777 n.10.
167. Id. at 779.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 768.
171. ld. at 785.
172. Id.
173. In addition, Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
disagreed with the court of appeals decision to remand for a determination of market
power. He suggested that the CJA lawyers really had no economic power because the
District government had the power to terminate the boycott at any time. Thus, Justice
Blackmun explained, the increase in fees was a result of political forces, not the result
of any economic power. Justice Blackmun agreed with the court of appeals' application




genuine issue as to whether the boycott involved any economic coercion,
there must be a showing of market power, as the court of appeals ruled,
before categorically condemning the boycott.174 The dissent maintained
that the administrative efficiency interest in the per se rule was
insufficient, noting that "[t]he First Amendment does not permit the State
to sacrifice speech for efficiency." 75
The dissent buttressed its analysis by relying on the traditional
rule that a presumption of illegality of a broad prophylactic rule in the
area of expressive activity is unacceptable.176 Specifically, in the area
of the first amendment, the dissent explained that there must be a more
particularized analysis of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
antitrust violations.' 7  The dissent suggested that "the FTC cannot
ignore the particular factual circumstances before it by emphasizing a
presumption of illegality in the guise of a per se rule.
17s
The decision rendered in SCTLA presents a potential danger to
expressive activity. The majority showed an extreme reluctance to
recognize first amendment interest in non-traditional speech activity. In
addition, SCTLA could lead to the erosion of Claibome Hardware, which
is crucial to the protection of the expressive component of boycotts.
In addition to SCTLA, the Supreme Court rendered another
decision in which a traditional form of expressive activity received
considerably less protection. In United States v. Kokinda,17  the
174. Id. at 778.
175. Id. at 783 n.2.
176. See NAACP v. Butler, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958).
177. SCTLA, 110 S. Ct. at 784 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 785. The dissent also rejected the majority's attempt to distinguish
between the lawyers' boycott and the boycott in NAACP. The dissent quoted Justice
Stevens' statement in Claiborne that "' [t] he established elements of speech, assembly,
association, and petition, 'though not identical, are inseparable" when combined in an
expressive boycott." Id. at 789 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 911 (citation omitted)). In addition, the dissent
suggested that even if there was a different purpose for the lawyers' boycott, that should
not have rendered it any less expressive. Further, Justice Brennan rejected the Court's
conclusion that the broad media coverage of the boycott indicated that the boycott itself
was not expressive. Rather, Justice Brennan claimed that the boycott was an attempt to
convey a message and that by sacrificing their income, the lawyers wanted to
demonstrate their commitment to achieving higher compensation. Justice Brennan
stressed the historic importance of boycotts, especially to the "'poorly financed causes
of little people."' id. at 790 (quoting Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)).
179. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
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Supreme Court upheld a regulation which banned in-person solicitation at
federal post offices."1°  Respondents, volunteers for the National
Democratic Policy Committee and Lyndon LaRouche, had set up a table
on the sidewalk near the entrance of a Maryland post office to solicit
contributions and distribute literature concerning various political
issues."' The respondents were convicted for in-person solicitation.1 2
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, however,
holding that the postal sidewalk was a public forum and that the
government had demonstrated no compelling state interest in prohibiting
expression in such a forum.'
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed and upheld the
conviction.'" The Court recognized that solicitation is a form of speech
protected by the first amendment.'" However, a plurality of four
Justices wrote that the postal sidewalk constituted government property
which was not a public forum and had not been available for expressive
activity."t According to the plurality, therefore, the first amendment
was of only limited applicabilty, and the government's regulation was
valid if it was reasonably related to a legitimate government interest
according to Perry v. Local Educational Association."'
In defining the nature of the postal sidewalk, the Supreme Court
suggested that the sidewalk leads only from the postal parking area to the
front door and was thus distinguishable from the traditional public
sidewalk referred to in Perry.8 The plurality noted that a public street
180. Id. at 3117.
181. id.
182. Id. at 3118.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 3115.
185. Id. at 3118.
186. Id. at 3121.
187. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In an effort to make a distinction between different types
of forums on government property, the Supreme Court in Perry set out a three part
framework to determine how first amendment rights should be analyzed with respect to
government property. First, regulation of speech on government property that has
traditionally been open to the public is subject to strict scrutiny. Second, regulation of
speech on government property that has been expressly dedicated for such activity is also
subject to strict scrutiny; and third, regulation of speech activity where the government
has not dedicated its property to such first amendment activity is subject to the rational
relationship test. See Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119-29; Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298, 301-04 (1974).
188. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120.
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is considered a public forum because it is "continually open, often
uncongested, and constitutes not only a necessary conduit in the daily
affairs of a locality's citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy
the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed
environment."'" The Supreme Court rejected this characterization of
the postal sidewalk. 1"
In light of its conclusion that the sidewalk was not a traditional
public forum, the plurality reasoned that the government could control
access based on subject matter and speaker identity as long as the
regulation was reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and
was viewpoint neutral. 9' The postal service asserted that the
governmental interest was to ensure the most efficient and effective postal
service system." Following this logic, the government contended, and
the plurality agreed, that it was reasonable to restrict solicitation because
solicitation is "inherently disruptive of the postal services business. " "
Although agreeing with the plurality's conclusion, Justice
Kennedy did not agree with its analysis. In a separate concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy wrote that the sidewalk might be considered a public
forum, but that the post office rule was nevertheless constitutional as a
time, place and manner restriction." Applying this standard, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the regulation merely prohibited personal
solicitations on postal property for the immediate payment of money.195
Justice Kennedy stated that the regulation was justified because it made no
reference to content and was narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest. 19 Additionally, alternative means of
communicating information were available." Justice Brennan, writing
for the dissent, objected to the plurality's use of the analysis in Perry,
which involved internal mail services of public schools, in the context of
189. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 651
(1981).
190. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120.
191. Id. at 3121-22.
192. Id. at 3122.
193. Id. at 3123.
194. Id. at 3125-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 3126.
196. Id.
197. Justice Kennedy noted that the nation's similar judgments have been made with
respect to classic public forums in the capital, where solicitation of money is banned on
the mall. Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(h) (1989)).
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traditional public forums such as sidewalks. 'I Rejecting the plurality's
conclusions that the "proprietary" nature of the post office renders the
sidewalk less of a public forum, Justice Brennan suggested that the
plurality was confusing the sidewalk with the interior of the post
office. 1"
Justice Brennan pointed out that there was no indication that the
solicitors interfered in any way with the post office's business.' There
is a distinction between solicitation that blocks the entrance to the post
office or is disruptive of business and solicitation which merely takes
place on the sidewalk? 1 There already existed regulations prohibiting
the obstruction of the entrance or disrupting the business of the post
office.'
The dissent contended that it is not important that the sidewalk
runs only between the parking lot and the post office entrance. M
3
Explaining that the "existence of a public forum does not turn on a
particularized factual inquiry into whether a sidewalk serves one building
or many or whether a street is a dead end or a major thoroughfare," the
dissent rejected the plurality's narrow view of what constitutes a public
forum.'
Even under the reasonableness standard applicable to non-public
forums, the dissent contended that the regulation was not reasonable
because the postal service permits other potentially disruptive speech on
a case-by-case basis."0 The dissent also disagreed with the conclusion
that the regulation was content neutral." Justice Brennan pointed out
that if a solicitor says "please support my political advocacy group," he
would not be punished.?' However, if he says "please contribute $10,"
he is subject to prosecution.' The plurality placed a great deal of
emphasis on the fact that the post office received complaints and that
198. Id. at 3127 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 3130-31 n.4.
200. Id. at 3136.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 3129.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 3131 n.5.
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solicitation can be coercive.' However, speech should not be
subjected to regulation "simply because it may embarrass others or coerce
them into action. 2 10
Kokinda is potentially troubling for first amendment rights.
Although a majority did not support the forum rationale relied on by the
plurality, it would take only one more vote to adopt this analysis. As the
dissent argued, the result may well be to severely limit first amendment
rights in what have traditionally been considered public or limited public
forums.211
In its final decision focusing on the application of the first
amendment, the Supreme Court properly refused to apply the first
amendment so as to protect a university from disclosure of information
that might have revealed employment discrimination.212 In University
of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,23 the Supreme Court unanimously refused
to allow the first amendment right of "academic freedom" to shield
university tenure review files in an EEOC investigation of alleged
discrimination in a denial of tenure.214
In making its first amendment claim, the University specifically
focused on a previous statement by Justice Frankfurter that a university
possesses, under the first amendment, the right to "determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach. "215 The University contended that
the tenure review process was part of its first amendment right to decide
"who may teach. "26 To ensure the proper functioning of the tenure
system, the University argued, peer review files must remain completely
confidential. 27  The University also claimed that subjecting tenure
review files to disclosure would have a "chilling effect" on candid
evaluations and will thereby result in less qualified persons achieving
tenure. 8
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
211. Id. at 3126-27.
212. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 579.
215. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
216. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 586.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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The Supreme Court rejected the University's claim.219 The
University's reliance on prior case law was misplaced, the Court
explained, noting that the cases in which the Court protected a first
amendment right of "academic freedom" involved protecting the content
of speech at universities.' In addition, the Court expressed doubt that
the peer review process is any more essential in exercising the right to
decide "who may teach" than is the availability of money. 21 In short,
the first amendment does not apply.
The Supreme Court also noted that not all peer review systems
are done in confidence, and that possible disclosure of peer review files
would not undermine the tenure review process.' Rather, the Court
suggested that in the future, evaluators in the tenure review process will
simply ground their evaluations in specific examples so as to deflect any
claims of discrimination.2m
B. Decisions Concerning the Validity of Particular
Restrictions on Free Expression
The Supreme Court's remaining first amendment decisions during
the 1989-90 Term concerned efforts by state and federal authorities to
restrict forms of expression clearly entitled to at least some protection
under the first amendment. The results in these cases were mixed. The
court struck down free speech restrictions in three cases, including two
decided by 5-4 margins. In four other decisions, however, the Court
219. Id. at 578-79.
220. The Court explained that the decisions upon which the University relied
concerned content regulation of University expression. Id. at 586. In Sweezy, for
example, the Court protected a person's right not to answer questions about a speech he
had given at a state university. Id. However, the Court explained, a subpoena
requesting disclosure of peer review materials is not a content regulation. Id. The
subpoena is part of a larger process to eliminate discrimination in the workplace as well
as in academic institutions. The EEOC was only attempting to control the criteria the
University used in that process, to the extent permitted by federal fair employment laws,
which the Court has held is clearly lawful. Id. at 587.
221. Id. at 588. The Court was referring to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19
(1976), where the Court discussed how money is sometimes necessary in exercising first
amendment rights. For instance, the Court suggested that the University could not claim
a violation of its first amendment rights as a result of taxes that deprive the University
of revenue to bid for professors. University of Pa., 110 S. Ct. at 588.




upheld limitations on expression or issued conflicting rulings with
potentially troubling implications for the first amendment.
In Butterworth v. Smith,' the Court unanimously ruled that a
state could not make it criminal for grand jury witnesses to disclose
information about their own testimony after the grand jury has been
discharged.' A Florida statute generally prohibited grand jury
witnesses from ever disclosing testimony of any witness before the
jury.' Butterworth was a reporter who was called to testify and
warned by the prosecution that any revelation of his own testimony was
a violation of the law. 7 However, he wanted to write a news story
about his experiences, and sued for an injunction in federal court to
prevent the state from prosecuting him.' The district court granted
summary judgment for the state, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed.'
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the state had no
compelling state interest in prohibiting witnesses from making statements
that they would have been perfectly free to make if they had not first
testified to the same effect before a grand jury. If anything, the
Court reasoned, such a law would discourage such testimony, and thus
impede the search for truth, the ultimate goal of the grand jury. 1 The
Court upheld those parts of the statute which prohibited disclosure of any
matters before the proceedings are completed, and of testimony of other
witnesses after the grand jury has finished, because such secrecy exists in
all jurisdictions and serves the state interests of encouraging witnesses and
jurors to perform their functions without fear of outside influence and
retribution that public exposure could cause."3
The Supreme Court relied on the precedent of Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,' which overruled a Virginia statute
that criminalized the disclosure of information regarding proceedings
before the state judicial review commission.' The Court in
224. 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990).
225. Id. at 1378.
226. FLA. STAT. § 905.27 (1989).
227. Bunerworth, 110 S. Ct. at 1378.
228. Id. at 1379.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1383.
231. Id. at 1380.
232. Id.
233. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
234. Butterworth, 110 S. Ct. at 1380.
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Butterworth also distinguished Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,35 which
upheld a prohibition on a newspaper revealing information obtained in
discovery proceedings, since the witness in Butterworth knew the
information before attending the proceedings and was free to reveal what
he knew if he did not testify, while the reporter in Seattle knew the
information only because of and through the judicial proceeding.'
A closer victory for the first amendment resulted from the Court's
decision in United States v. Eichman. 3  In Eichman, the Court
addressed essentially the same issue that it did in Texas v. Johnson:'8
Whether the first amendment prohibits the government from barring
citizens from burning or desecrating an American flag. 9 The primary
difference between the cases was that Eichmann involved a federal rather
than a state law, which was enacted by Congress in a specific attempt to
respond to and get around the decision in Johnson.' Regardless, the
Court's opinion was terse, relying heavily on Johnson, with all justices
voting the same as they did in that case."1
The government argued in Eichman that the federal law was on
its face content neutral compared to the Texas statute struck down in
Johnson, which stated that the only acts prohibited were those "that the
actor knows will seriously offend onlookers." 2 The Court ruled that
this purported distinction was not relevant, holding that "it is nevertheless
clear that the Government's asserted interest is related to the supression
of free expression." ' Thus the Court found the Act substantively
indistinguishable from its Texas counterpart, despite the differences in
form.
The only dissenting opinion in Eichman was written by Justice
Stevens." The dissent was composed and restrained, in contrast to the
235. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
236. Buzterworth, 110 S. Ct. at 1381. The Court noted further that neither the
federal courts nor a majority of states find a restriction like Florida's necessary to the
functioning of their grand juries. Id. at 1382.
237. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
238. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
239. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2406.
240. Id. at 2407.
241. Id. at 2406.
242. Id. at 2408.
243. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547).
244. Id. at 2410 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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vigorous and pointed dissents in Johnson.' Perhaps in explicit
recognition of the extent to which flagwaving and flagburning had become
so politicized, Stevens specifically noted that:
the integrity of the [flag as a] symbol has been
compromised by those leaders who seem to advocate
compulsory worship of the flag even by individuals
whom it offends, or who seem to manipulate the symbol
of national purpose into a pretext for partisan disputes
about meaner ends.'
Justice Stevens' dissent argued that the law did not restrict any
form of speech other than the act of flagburning, and whatever
flagburners are attempting to say by their actions they are free to
verbalize." 7 Protesters were not being punished for the content of their
speech, Stevens suggested, but only for their means of saying it, and the
government is completely indifferent to the message being conveyed.'
As the majority recognized, however, flagburning is an internationally
recognized method of dramatically expressing disagreement with
government. 9 Thus, while the Act did not, like a traditional sedition
law, ban all speech criticizing a policy or the government, it did ban a
particular means of expessing criticism of the government generally, albeit
a means which does not itself clearly state what exactly the protester is for
or against.2"
The immediate effect of the decision in Eichman was an
unsuccessful attempt to reverse the decision by passing a constitutional
amendment to empower the government to outlaw flagburning.Y The
Flag Protection Act had been passed quickly amidst the outcry after Texas
245. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548-55. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, for
example, included the words and a brief history of the "Star Spangled Banner," a short
history of the battle of Iwo Jima, Ralph Waldo Emerson's Concord Hymn ("the shot
heard round the world"), and John Greenleaf Whittier's Civil War poem "Barbara
Frietchie" ("Peace and order and beauty draw/ Round thy symbol of light and law;/ And
ever the stars above look down/ On thy stars below in Frederick town!").
246. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2411.
248. Id.
249. Id at 2411-12.
250. Id. at 2409, 2411.
251. See Denniston, Flagburning Cases Tip First Amendment Scales, AM. LAw.,
Sept. 1990, at 89.
1990]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
v. Johnson. Some members of Congress who voted for the Act, however,
refused to vote to amend the Bill of Rights.25 2  Justice Stevens'
admonishment against partisan abuse of the flag was widely quoted and
may well have encouraged members of Congress to vote according to
their consciences rather than their political fears. In any event, the
proposed constitutional amendment failed to win support of two-thirds of
either the House or the Senate. 53
Another 5-4 decision in favor of free speech was Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois,' where the issue was whether previous
Court decisions prohibiting governments from firing low-level, non-policy
making employees solely on the basis of their political affiliation should
be extended to promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring determinations as
well. 5 The Court ruled that the answer was yes.'
Illinois Governor Thompson issued a hiring freeze in 1980, which
prohibited hiring any employee, filling any vacancy, creating a new
position or taking similar action without the governor's express
permission. 7 All those requesting approval for employment were
examined for whether they voted recently in Republican primaries, gave
financial support to the party and its candidates, did campaign work, and
had the support of local party officials. 8 Suit was brought by several
state workers denied jobs, promotions, transfers, or recalls after
layoffs. 9 The Seventh Circuit dismised the hiring discrimination claim
and remanded the others for a determination of whether the practices
constituted the "substantial equivalent of dismissal," defined as that which
would lead a reasonable person to resign.' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the issue of whether existing first amendment
prohibitions against politically motivated firings extends to decisions on
hiring, recall, transfer, and promotion."6
252. Id.
253. Parloff, Struck Down but Effective, MANHATTAN LAW., Sept. 1990, at 19.
254. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).





260. Id. at 2733.
261. Id. at 2732.
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In Elrod v. Burns262 and Brand v. Finkel,2 the Court ruled
that only if party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the
position in question could an employee be fired for partisan reasons.'
None of the Justices in Rutan contended that the difference between firing
an employee for his party affiliation and refusing to promote, transfer or
hire was of constitutional significance. The real issue was not whether to
extend the precedent, but whether Elrod and Brand should be overruled
altogether.' No Justice disputed that the political patronage system
pressures employees to support, in fact and in deed, causes and candidates
that they May not actually support in mind.' Neither did any Justice
disagree with the general proposition that the government may not
condition a public benefit upon a sacrifice of first amendment rights. At
issue was whether the government interests in maintaining a patronage
system outweigh the first amendment rights subordinated by the
system.2 7
The dissent maintained -that compelling government interests
existed in stabilizing political parties, preventing excessive political
fragmentation, maintaining party discipline, fostering the two-party
system, fostering social and political integration of excluded groups, and
increasing government efficiency and effectiveness." s The dissent
discussed at great length the positive impacts of the patronage system on
political parties and the American political system, including praising the
virtues of machine politics.' On the issue of government efficiency
and effectiveness, the dissent declared that because it is uncertain whether
a patronage system or a civil service system based on merit is superior,
as long as the state can rationally contend that the patronage system is
superior, it is up to the electorate to decide which system to use.Y
262. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
263. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
264. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363.
265. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737.
266. "It is undeniable, of course, that the patronage system entails some constraint
upon the expression of views, particularly at the partisan-election stage, and considerable
constraint upon the employee's right to associate with the other party." Id. at 2755
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 2753-56.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2755-57.
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The majority, however, correctly found protection of the political
party system to be an inappropriate state interest to justify state action
taken not as a lawmaking body, but as an employer.271 It also found
that the interest of preserving effectiveness of the government can be
obtained without the burden on first amendment rights caused by making
political loyalty a governing criterion for hiring, firing, or promoting
workers.' r This failure to narrowly tailor the policy to the desired end
rendered the practice unconstitutional. 2'
A more ambiguous result was reached in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co. ,' where the Court addressed the issue of whether the first
amendment provides blanket immunity from state libel laws for an opinion
that neither states nor implies any fact about an individual that can
reasonably be proven true or false.275 Although the case produced two
different opinions, the Court unanimously agreed that such immunity
already existed pursuant to its earlier first amendment precedents, despite
the fact that it had never been so enunciated. 6 In the application of the
271. Id. at 2734-35 (majority opinion).
272. Id. at 2735-38.
273. Id. The dissent also objected to the Court ruling that a practice such as the
patronage system unconstitutional when it is supported by long tradition and is not
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This
ignores the fact that until recently, no property right in government employment was
recognized at all, and thus an employee had no reasonable constitutional objection to a
completely groundless dismissal, much less for partisan reasons. Such reasoning also
ignores the fact that constitutional guarantees are necessarily general in nature, and very
few actual practices are expressly forbidden. The dissent's rationale could just as easily
have been employed in 1954 to uphold state-mandated school segregation, a practice then
supported by long tradition and not explicitly prohibited in the Constitution or the equal
protection clause.
274. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
275. Id. at 2707.
276. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), the Supreme
Court held that a statement by a media defendant on a matter of public concern must be
provable as false before liability can be assessed, and that the burden of proving falsity
was on the plaintiff. In Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6
(1970), the Supreme Court held that statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as
stating actual facts are protected from libel suits in order to assure public debate does
not suffer from a lack of imaginative expression or rhetorical hyberbole. In that case,
the defendant had referred to a real estate developer as a "blackmailer," and the court
found that in the context that it was used, plaintiff was not being accused of extortion
in the criminal sense. This reasoning was followed in the case of Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), in which the Supreme Court held that an ad parody
could not be reasonably interpreted as stating or implying that the plaintiff had actually
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privilege to the actual case, however, the Court divided on the issue of
whether or not the statements implied any facts. The Court ruled seven
to two that the statements did imply facts, and that the defendent could
thus be subject to liability for libel.' The case involved an article by
a newspaper columnist with a regular "opinion" column in the sports
section of an Ohio newspaper. The article involved Milkovich, a
wrestling coach, whose team was disciplined by athletic authorities for
extracurricular violence at a meet, which the author of the article blamed
Milkovich for inciting.278 The punishment was reversed for due process
violations in the proceeding resulting in the suspension, and while the
article stated that fact, the tone of the article nonetheless suggested that
Milkovich perjured himself on the merits to obtain that result. 279
Several aspects of Milkovich are troubling from the perspective of
the first amendment. The majority devoted very little attention to the
question of whether the article implied factually that Milkovich perjured
himself.m° In fact, however, the majority opinion fails to discuss
several factors suggesting that the article did not truly imply facts. As the
dissent noted, the article was written in the county in which the high
school students that were assaulted during the meet was located, a fact
which would alert any reader that the author was highly biased on the
issue." 1 Also noted by the dissent was that the "'reasonable reader who
had intercourse with his mother in an outhouse; and in Old Dominion Branch No. 496,
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), in which the Supreme
Court held that the use of the word "traitor" for a union "scab" could not reasonably be
interpreted as accusing the plaintiff of treason.
277. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2708 (1990).
278. Id. at 2698-99.
279. Id. at 2698.
280. Indeed, the entire extent of the Court's analysis was as follows:
As the Ohio Supreme Court itself observed, "the
clear impact in some nine sentences and a
caption is that [Milkovich] 'lied at the hearing
after ... having given his solemn oath to tell the
truth.'" This is not the sort of loose, figurative
or hyperbolic language which would negate the
impression that the writer was seriously
maintaining petitioner committed the crime of
perjury. Nor does the general tenor of the
article negate this impression.
Id. at 2707 (citation omitted) (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 251,
496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986)).
281. Id. at 2713 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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peruses [a] column on the editorial or Op-Ed page is fully aware that the
statements found there are not 'hard' news like those printed on the front
page or elsewhere in the news sections of the newspaper. 't12  The
column, a regular opinion column in the sports section, was even
headlined, "Maple beat the law with the 'big lie "° and subheadlined,
"Diadiun says Maple told a lie. "o The impact of the case on editorial
freedom in more political matters is a very significant concern, as the
dissent suggested:
Did NASA officials ignore sound warnings that
the Challenger Space Shuttle would explode? Did Cuban-
American leaders arrange for John Fitzgerald Kennedy's
assasination? Was Kurt Waldheim a Nazi officer? Such
questions are matters of public concern long before all
the facts are unearthed, if they ever are. Conjecture is a
means of fueling a national discourse on such questions
and stimulating public pressure for answers from those
who know more. 25
The majority's failure even to address such points in its analysis is
disturbing, regardless of the propriety of the actual decision.
Another disturbing aspect of the decision is its potential impact on
responsible journalism. Editorials with no factual basis that simply "sling
mud" and add little to intelligent discourse on an issue of public concern
are protected under the Court's analysis; in fact, the less relevant
information the editorial adds, the more protected it is. More
"responsible" editorials, however, which voice suspicions, but include
statements potentially provable as false, must be printed at greater risk
after Milkovich.
Another case which produced mixed results was FWIPBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas,2s where the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Dallas ordinance which provided that sexually oriented businesses must
submit to inspections whenever ownership changes or an application is
filed for an annual permit renewal. In contrast, the city required that
other businesses undergo such inspections only when they move to a new
282. Id. (quoting Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986 (1984)).
283. Id. at 2698 (majority opinion).
284. Id. at 2712-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 2714.
286. 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990).
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location or the building use changes." The chief of police was
required to issue the license within thirty days of receipt of an application
under the Dallas scheme, but the issuance was conditioned on approval by
other municipal agencies that had no time limits within which inspections
must occur.288
The Supreme Court held that because the licensing scheme creates
the potential for prior restraint of constitutionally protected speech,
procedural safeguards are necessary to provide protection. 2 9 Since the
case of Freedman v. Maryland,'  three requirements have been
considered necessary with respect to prior restraints on activities which
may be protected by the first amendment: 1) any restraint prior to judicial
review can be imposed only for a specified, brief period during which the
status quo must be maintained; 2) expeditious judicial review of that
decision must be available; and 3) the censor must bear the burden of
going to court to suppress the speech and must bear the burden of proof
once in court."9
Although the Justices in Dallas wrote a number of opinions, the
majority appeared to reach some consensus on the first amendment
standards applicable to ordinances regulating sexually oriented businesses.
A plurality, including Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Stevens, held that
the first two Freedman requirements apply to such ordinances, that the
third requirement does not apply, and that the Dallas ordinance was
unconstitutional because it failed to comply with the two applicable
Freedman requirements.' Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
concurred, but claimed that all three Freedman requirements had to be
met for the statute to be considered constitutional.' Justices White,
Rehnquist and Scalia dissented, claiming that none of the three
requirements need be met because the ordinance was not a licensing
scheme with prior restraint potential, but a time, place, and manner
287. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
288. FWIPBS, 110 S. Ct. at 605.
289. Id. at 603.
290. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
291. Id. at 58-59,followed in Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968)
(involving another motion picture censorship ordinance); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (city's refusal to rent municipal facilities because of
musical's content).
292. FWIPBS, 110 S. Ct. at 603, 604.
293. Id. at 611 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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restriction.' A majority of the Justices thus appeared to hold that at
least the first two requirements of Freedman, but not the third, apply to
ordinances regulating sexually oriented businesses.
The plurality in Dallas justified the inapplicability of placing the
burdens of proof and going to court on the city which promulgated the
ordinance by stating that the rationale behind this requirement is that
"'[t]he exhibitor's stake in any one picture may be insufficient to warrant
a protracted and onerous course of litigation.'"" They reasoned that
in the case of a whole shop being closed, as in the case of a Dallas-type
ordinance, the greatly increased incentive to sue warranted relieving the
city of bearing the burden of going to court to effect the denial and the
burden of proof once in court.' Brennan's concurrence differed,
stating that the reason the burdens are on the city or the censor is "'the
transcendent value of speech,'"' " not the incentive to sue.
The plurality opinion creates potentially significant uncertainties
for future cases. Under its analysis, the question in future cases of who
bears the burden of proof and whether a given licensed business in
question will be closed or open during the time of judicial review may
depend upon the vague and uncertain question of how much incentive
exists for the business owner to sue. Although this may not be a difficult
determination in some cases, the opinion fails to provide a clear basis for
drafters of ordinances and licensing schemes in other matters. Some
businesses may be closed, the victims of prior restraint, perhaps until the
294. Id. at 614-17 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 617-
25 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Time, place, and manner
restrictions are not subject to strict scrutiny [but are constitutional] if they are content
neutral, designed to serve a substantial governmental interest, and do not unreasonably
limit alternative means of communication." Id. at 614 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted). The dissent suggested that the decision in Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), in which an ordinance was upheld that
required adult theaters be a certain distance from houses, churches and schools, was
upheld, permitted FWIPBS type ordinances as well. FWIPBS is distinguishable from
Renton, however, because the ordinance fails to serve a substantial state interest. It is
obvious that an adult theater could substantially reduce property values in a residential
neighborhood, while a general audience theater would not. It is not apparent, once a
business is established, why a sexually oriented business would require more fire and
building code inspections than a similar non-sexually oriented business. Furthermore,
the O'Brien test has never been applied in a prior restraint situation.
295. FWIPBS, 110 S. Ct. at 606 (plurality opinion) (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S.
at 59).
296. Id. at 606, 607.
297. Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S at 58).
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Supreme Court decides that inadequate incentives to sue existed to warrant
saddling the burdens on the business owner.
The plurality opinion also appears inconsistent with Blount v.
Rizzi."" That decision held unconstitutional a statute which permitted
the Postmaster General to stamp as unlawful and return to the sender all
letters and postal money orders addressed to a person whom he has found
is using the mails to distribute obscenity. 9' This scheme was held
unconstitutional in Blount because it failed to meet the three Freedman
requirements.' Even though a censored distributor would have every
incentive to sue because his livelihood would be at stake as a result of
such a decision by the Postmaster, the Supreme. Court several times
criticized the statute repeatedly because a distributor could only obtain full
judicial review on his own initiative?" In the interim, the Supreme
Court held, "'the prolonged threat of an adverse administrat[ive] decision
.. will have a severe restriction on the exercise of . . First
Amendment rights.
298. 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
299. Id.; see also 39 U.S.C. § 4006 (1960) (now 39 U.S.C. § 3006 (1970)).
300. Blount, 400 U.S. at 417-18.
301. The scheme has no statutory provision
requiring governmentally initiated judicial
participation in the procedure which bars the
magazines from the mails, or even any provision
assuring prompt judicial review. . . This,
however, does not redress the fatal flaw of the
procedure in failing to require that the
Postmaster General seek to obtain a prompt
judicial determination of the obscenity of the
material ....
Id. at 417-18. "[Tihe section does not satisfy the requirement that the [licensors] assume
the burden of seeking a judicial determination .... '[li]t is vital that prompt judicial
review . . . be assured on the Government's initiative .... Id. at 420 (citation
omitted).
302. Id. at 421-22 (quoting United States v. Book Bin, 306 F. Supp. 1023, 1028
(N.D. Ga. 1969)). The plurality opinion also appears to contradict Riley v. National
Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). In Riley, the Court held
unconstitutional a licensing scheme that required professional fundraisers to obtain a
license prior to fundraising because of lack of definite time limits for issuance of the
license, and because in the interim, the "delay compelpled] the speaker's silence." Id.
at 802. A professional fundraiser's livelihood is as much at stake by a denial of such
a license as the shop owners in FWIPBS; they all have just as much incentive to sue.
Nevertheless, in Riley, the Court never suggested that any less than all the Freedman
requirements need be met.
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The Supreme Court's creation in Dallas of a partial Freedman
review, which makes the burden of going to court and bearing the burden
of proof subject to a factual determination regarding incentive to sue, does
not appear sound. The decision disregards several previous precedents,
seperates procedural requirements that should be inexorably intertwined,
provides no clear basis for drafters of ordinances to use, and creates the
potential for prior restraints on the basis of content, which have been
traditionally regarded as among the most onerous restrictions on free
speech.
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,' the issue
before the Supreme Court was whether the first amendment right of
corporations to use general funds -to endorse or oppose candidates in
elections was outweighed by the interest of the state in prohibiting such
expenditures.' The Michigan Campaign Finance Act °5 prohibited
both profit and non-profit corporations, excluding media corporations,
from using general funds for endorsing or opposing candidates in state
elections.' Under that law, corporations are permitted only to use
segregated funds earmarked for political purposes.' The Michigan
Chamber of Commerce sought an injunction against the Act because it
wished to use general funds to endorse a candidate."° The Supreme
Court found that the Act did not violate the first amendment because
compelling state interests outweighed the constitutional rights of
corporations.' Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy dissented.3"'
Prior to Austin, the only government interest compelling enough
to restrict campaign spending has been "[pireventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption .. ."311 The majority in Austin ruled that this
interest justified the Michigan statute by suggesting that it was aimed at
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
303. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
304. Corporations are entitled to protection of freedom of speech. See First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
305. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1979).
306. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1395.
307. Id.; see also MICH. COMp. LAWS § 169.255(1).
308. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1395.
309. Id. at 1396.
310. Id. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1417 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting).
311. Id. at 1397 (majority opinion) (quoting FEC v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)).
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that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's
political ideas."312 The Supreme Court stressed that the "unique state-
conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large
treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures."313
The Supreme Court distinguished Austin from FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc.314 (MCFL), in which an almost
identical federal statute was held unconstitutional as applied in MCFL,
involving a non-profit corporation devoted to political advocacy. 15 The
three distinguishing characteristics in the MCFL opinion were: 1) the non-
profit corporation "'was formed for the express purpose of promoting
political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities"';316 2) the
"absence of 'shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim
on its assets or earnings,' [which] 'ensures that persons connected with
the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with
it if they disagree with its political activity"'; and 3) MCFL's
"independence from the influence of business corporations" and its policy
of not accepting contributions from businesses, so that it could not
"serv[e] as [a] condui[t] for the type of direct spending that creates a
threat to the political marketplace."317 The Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, on the other hand, was founded to, and does, participate in
both political and non-political activites.31s Thus a member could
disagree with the political expenditures but continue to pay dues in order
to enjoy the non-political benefits and make business contacts. In
addition, over three-quarters of its funds came from business corporations;
the Chamber could thus serve to funnel funds from for-profit corporations
should the Supreme Court hold the act applicable only to for-profit
corporations and not to non-profit ones, such as the Chamber. 19
312. Id. at 1397.
313. Id. at 1398.
314. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
315. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396-97.
316. Id. at 1399 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).
317. Id. at 1399-400 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).
318. Id. at 1399.
319. The logic of the funneling of funds argument may be undermined, however,
by the differing nature of profit and non-profit organizations. The primary reason for
membership in the Chamber may well be business contacts completely unrelated to the
endorsements, and withdrawal from the Chamber because of the endorsements could
have a negative impact on a member's position in the business community. The primary
reason for membership in a for-profit corporation, however, is profit, and great
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A key portion of the Supreme Court's decision was premised on
the notion that the state's regulatation of political expenditures is justified
by the advantages the state has conferred by creating a corporate structure
conducive to amassing capital. The Supreme Court stated that while
individuals and unincorporated unions may amass large treasuries, they do
it without significant state-conferred advantages, while corporations are
"'by far the most prominent example of entities that enjoy legal
advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate wealth." ''  The
State's compelling interest in this case is "to counterbalance those
advantages unique to the corporate form. "321
This argument, however, has potentially troubling implications for
future first amendment cases. As Justice Scalia observed in his dissent,
"the State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the
forfeiture of First Amendment rights. '"" For example, in FCC v.
League of Women Voters of California3  the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a ban on editorializing by noncommercial broadcasting
stations that receive federal funds.3" It was significant that the stations
were barred from using even wholly private funds because a small
percentage of its overall income came from federal grants.3" Yet in
Austin, all corporate assets are barred because some are achieved via
state-conferred "special advantages" or because some small portion may
represent the profits of someone who objects to the expenditure
somewhat, but not enough to divest from the corporation."
deference is given to corporate directors in their decisionmaking. If the directors believe
an expenditure is in the company's interest, and the shareholders do not, the directors
can be removed, or the dissenting shareholder may reinvest his money in a corporation
which does not dissipate its money but instead invests in the company or pays it to
shareholders.
320. Id. at 1400 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258 n.ll).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
323. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
324. Id. at 366, 373.
325. Id. at 386-87.
326. The decision in Austin does not appear fully consistent with Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1975), which held a law limiting campaign expenditures to $1,000
unconstitutional for the reason that expenditures by individuals and associations do not
raise a sufficient threat of corruption to justify prohibition, although it upheld a limitation
on contributions to campaigns, which did raise a sufficient threat. The Court in Buckley
suggested specifically that "legislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat
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The Austin Court correctly characterized as very great the burden
on an individual shareholder to discover and contest the corporate
directors' decision to endorse a candidate that the shareholder opposes
instead of utilizing that money for dividend payments.3 27 Furthermore,
the Michigan law does permit the use of segregated funds, so that a
corporation's free expression is not wholly limited, and the resultant
expression will more accurately reflect the individual shareholders'
support for candidates. 31 The state's interests in regulating corporate
spending in political campaigns are also very important. Nevertheless,
some of the analysis employed in the decision remains potentially
problemtatic from a first amendment perspective.
One of the Supreme Court's most troubling free speech decisions
this term was Osborne v. Ohio.32' At issue was an Ohio law which
prohibited the possession or viewing of "any material or performance that
shows a minor who is not the person's child or ward in a state of nudity,"
unless the possessor has a valid artistic, medical, or scientific reason for
possession, or knows that the child's parents or guardians have consented
in writing to the "photographing or use of the minor in a state of nudity
and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or
transferred. '131 The statute as written appears overbroad and
unconstitutional, for it would make it a crime for a person to have a
photograph of his own grandchild without clothes on unless he had the
parent's written permission. The Court noted, however, that the Ohio
Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted the statute to apply only to
"depictions of nudity involving a lewd exhibition or graphic focus on a
minor's genitals." 331  Osborne was arrested for possession of
photographs depicting nude male adolescents in "sexually explicit
of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment."
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50. The Court in Austin sought to distinguish Buckley by
suggesting that the Michigan statute was aimed at "a different type of corruption"
consisting of the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and have little or no correlation to
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
In contrast to Buckley, however, the government in Austin did not adduce specific
evidence concerning the dangers actually posed by corporate political spending.
327. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1405 n.5.
328. Id. at 1398.
329. 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
330. OHlto REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3)(b) (Anderson 1989).
331. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1695 (citing State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 525
N.E.2d. 1363 (1988)).
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positions" and his conviction was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court.332
Although the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the
convictions could not stand for procedural reasons, six Justices voted to
remand for a new trial, and ruled that the statute was constitutional as
interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court.
33
Prior to Osborne, the Supreme Court had ruled that the first
amendment freedom to receive information protected all individuals' rights
to view anything they wish in the privacy of their own homes. 3 4
Stanley v. Georgia33' held that citizens have the right to possess
obscenity in the privacy of their own homes, despite the fact that
obscenity enjoys no constitutional protection, and that the state's interest
in protecting the minds of its citizens from being poisoned by obscenity
was not compelling enough to impinge upon that right. 3' The Osborne
Court sought to distinguish the Ohio law from the Georgia law on the
basis that the state's compelling interest to protect the children used in
production of the pornography, not the viewer. 37 The Supreme Court
reasoned that criminalization of possession, by presumably reducing the
market for child pornography, would serve to protect such children. 38
As the dissent pointed out, however, the same argument was rejected in
Stanley, because the criminalization of private possession of such
materials, while greatly infringing a fundamental liberty, does exceedingly
little to solve the problem.
339
The Osborne decision was a major expansion of the Supreme
Court's ruling in New York v. Ferber,' which upheld a statute
outlawing the distribution of child pornography. t The important first
amendment question arising from Osborne is whether the decision will
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1703, 1705.
334. Id. at 1695 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
335. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
336. Id. at 565.
337. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1714 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority evaded this issue by reason
of the weak state interests in Stanley. Even assuming, however, that Stanley did not
create an absolute right, and Ohio's interest was compelling, the Court cited no evidence
that the Ohio law would in fact reduce the market, and, thus, exploitation, which was
the issue. A law abridging a fundamental right must actually serve a state interest, not
simply espouse one.




provide the precedent for effectively overruling Stanley, despite the
Court's attempt to distinguish it. It is certainly arguable that the process
of producing obscene materials results in the victimization of some of the
participants, even though some victims are adults, presumably
participating of their own free will. Whether in the future the Supreme
Court will find a state interest in protecting adults from obscenity
production compelling enough to overrule Stanley is impossible to
determine. The Supreme Court has classified the value of child
pornography as "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis," '2 a conclusion
reaffirmed in Osborne.Y Certainly, no court would find any difficulty
in classifying the value of obscenity, which by definition has no literary,
artistic, political, or scientific merit, as de minimis. Ferber, according to
Brennan's dissent, "did nothing more than place child pornography on the
same level of First Amendment protection as obscene adult pornography,
meaning that its production and distribution could be proscribed." ''
Osborne, however, may have placed child pornography on an even lower
level of first amendment protection. Only so long as the Supreme Court
believes that child pornography is substantially worse than adult obscenity,
and that adults freely contracting to depict obscenity need no protection
from the law, will the decision in Stanley survive Osborne. The results
could pose risks to first amendment interests extending far beyond the
facts of Osborne and Stanley. 5
In the final anaylsis, only one thing is certain: it is no longer true
that, as the Supreme Court persuasively declared in Stanley, "[ilf the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling
a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch."' The crucial question now is how much such
business the state has retained. In Osborne, the Supreme Court stated that
its decision in Stanley should not be read too broadly. 7 It would have
342. Id. at 762.
343. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1695.
344. Id. at 1713 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
345. For example, the Court could also reexamine its decision in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), which protects the right of newspapers to publish
the identity of crime victims. Although there appears to be a much greater public
interest in publishing and receiving such information than child pornography or
obscenity, the publication of such information exacerbates the victim's injury and
increases the likelihood of non-reporting. The Court's concern for victims is laudable,
but it must be careful in weighing those interests against first amendment rights.
346. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
347. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1695.
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been better if the Supreme Court had suggested that its decision in
Osborne should not be read too broadly either.
